Abstract. We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In particular, in the context of a jury setup, all voting rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) induce the same set of equilibria outcomes. We show the robustness of our results with respect to several restrictions on communication protocols and jurors' strategies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our observations extend to practically all of the voting structures commonly studied in the voting literature. The paper suggests the importance of accounting for communication in models of collective choice.
Introduction

Overview
Unanimous juries date back to fourteenth-century English common law and have become the American standard during the colonial period. Louisiana was the rst to revolutionize the system. In 1928, it authorized a supermajority of 10 out of 12 jurors to acquit or convict in felony trials. Six years later, Oregon ensued with a section in its state constitution allowing for verdicts when ve-sixths of a jury in a criminal trial agree. While murder defendants can most always be convicted solely by unanimous juries comprised of 12 jurors, civil cases in the U.S. portray an entirely di erent picture. 39 state courts have reduced the size of civil juries to 6, 7, 8, or 10 persons. Non-unanimous decision rules are utilized in 30 state courts and range from 2/3 majority, to 3/4 majority, to 5/6 majority, to 7/8 majority. 1 The structure of jury decision making has long been the center of many political and legal debates (see Kalven and Zeisel [1966] and Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington [1983] ). Recently, there has been a mushrooming of economic analysis of jury decision making, and more generally, of strategic voting behavior (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] , Myerson [1998] , and Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996 , 1997 , 1998 ]). The approach the economic literature has taken follows that of Condorcet [1785] . Broadly speaking, each juror receives an independent piece of information concerning the guilt of the defendant and subsequently casts her vote. Since the juror's vote matters only when she is pivotal, a strategic juror considers the information contained in the event of pivotality, taking into account her fellow jurors' strategies. There are two sets of conclusions this literature has produced. First, unanimity is expected to perform worse than non unanimous voting rules. Second, as jury size becomes in nitely large, non unanimous voting rules fully aggregate the available information and generate e cient outcomes. Surprisingly, two elements are missing from most of the prior theoretical discussion. The rst is the fundamental fact of pre-vote deliberation. The second is the absence of comparison among non-unanimous voting rules (majority and di erent forms of supermajority), despite the prevalence of these rules in U.S. jurisdiction.
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The goal of the current paper is to explore the potential e ects of deliberations on outcomes generated by a wide range of voting rules. We point to a broad array of environments, encompassing the standard jury setup, in which deliberations render a large class of (non unanimous) voting institutions equivalent in terms of the sets of (sequential) equilibrium outcomes they generate. 3 We nd our theoretical observations interesting in that they illustrate the importance of modeling deliberations in collective choice environments. In particular, any venture to explain the variance of di erent voting schemes observed in U.S. civil courts would necessitate structural assumptions on the protocols of jury deliberations.
In more detail, we start by considering a general version of the standard jury and strategic voting models. A jury of nite size faces a decision to acquit or convict a defendant.
Each juror has a private type, corresponding to her private information and her personal preferences (e.g., her interpretation of what reasonable doubt means). We rst concentrate on threshold voting rules. These are rules under which the defendant is convicted only if a certain threshold number of jurors favor conviction (corresponding to the rules prevailing in the U.S. court system). When communication is prohibited, di erent voting rules may generate di erent equilibrium outcomes (see Example 2) . We investigate whether such di erences between voting rules persist when the jurors can communicate with one another. Our rst result shows that when deliberations occur, regardless of the information and preferences structure, all decision rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) generate the same set of equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, under a unanimous voting rule it is possible to generate only a smaller set of outcomes.
To see the intuition behind this result, suppose an outcome is implementable under a certain voting rule. We show that the same outcome can be implemented with the following protocol and strategies. At the deliberation stage the jurors determine collectively the alternative to select. Then, they all vote in favor of it. In other words, the outcome is implemented with a strategy pro le under which there is always unanimous consensus. Given these strategies, a juror does not have any incentive to deviate at the voting stage if the voting rule is non unanimous. In fact, her vote is never pivotal.
Consider the communication protocol and the voting strategies that we have just described. Of course, to determine whether an outcome is implementable or not, we need to consider the incentives of every juror to reveal her information during deliberations. These incentives depend on how the juror's information a ects the collective choice. The incentives, however, do not depend on the voting rule. The equivalence result for non unanimous voting rules follows. Clearly, a unilateral deviation at the voting stage may be bene cial when unanimity is required. This is why unanimous rules yield smaller sets of equilibrium outcomes than those generated by intermediate voting rules.
The intuitive outline of the equivalence result suggests that a juror might nd herself voting (together with the rest of the jurors) for the alternative she least prefers, simply because her unilateral deviation will not alter the ultimate collective decision. Formally, this may raise the suspicion that the equivalence result hinges on jurors using weakly dominated strategies. On the contrary, we show that under rather weak restrictions on jurors' preferences, the equivalence result holds even when jurors do not use weakly dominated strategies.
These restrictions rule out situations in which jurors are blind partisans of one of the alternatives and are keen to select that alternative regardless of the realization of types. This is in line with the process of voir dire exercised in the selection of American juries. Voir dire is used to eliminate jurors that may be unable to consider the case at hand fairly, based only on the evidence presented in court. Therefore, by and large, the restrictions we suggest should hold in practice. Furthermore, these restrictions are, in fact, satis ed by the bulk of the theoretical voting models analyzed in the literature.
As for generality, the equivalence result extends beyond its manifestation in the jury setup. In fact, the equivalence stretches directly to situations in which there are more than two alternatives. In Section 4 we consider all voting structures that are comprised of actions and voting rules. The action sets can be arbitrary (e.g., selected alternatives, ranking orders of all of the alternatives, etc.). The equivalence result holds as long as the voting rules in question are veto-free. That is, for any alternative there is a pro le of feasible actions that yields that alternative via the voting rule, and is robust to any unilateral deviation. The class of veto-free voting rules contains most of the voting rules discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Cox [1987] ). For example, plurality rule, Borda rule, and Condorcet winner's selection method (for more than two alternatives) are veto-free. Speci cally, we show that for any xed set of alternatives, all veto-free voting structures are equivalent with respect to the equilibrium outcomes they generate. Furthermore, non veto-free structures yield sets of equilibrium outcomes that are subsets of those corresponding to the veto-free structures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 overviews the related literature.
Section 2 describes the general setup of a deliberating jury's decision making and provides the preliminary comparison between di erent threshold voting rules. Section 3 speci es the robustness of the equivalence results with respect to the communication protocols (Section 3.1) and with respect to the jurors' strategies (Section 3.2). Section 4 demonstrates the generalized equivalence result pertaining to any set of alternatives. Section 5 concludes.
Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Literature Review
While the literature on strategic voting with communication is still in its inception, there are a few recent contributions that relate to the current paper. Coughlan The groups could converse before casting their votes using either majority rule or unanimity.
They found no signi cant di erence in the decision lag when group decisions were made by majority rule relative to when they were made under a unanimity requirement.
The idea that communication may render a class of institutions equivalent appears in Matthews and Postlewaite [1989] who compare all two-person double auctions and show that they generate the same sets of equilibrium outcomes when the bidders can communicate before submitting their bids.
Deliberative Voting with Two Alternatives
Setup
A jury of n > 3 members has to choose one of two alternatives: A (acquit) or C (convict).
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Each juror i has a type t i which is private information. The type t i can capture juror i's preferences, her private knowledge of each of the alternatives' consequences, etc. We let T i denote the set of types of juror i, and assume that it is nite. T = Q n i=1 T i denotes the set of pro les of types, and p is the probability distribution over T: To simplify the exposition and avoid a few technical issues, we assume that the probability distribution p has full support 4 While our terminology follows closely that of the standard jury models, of course the same setup can be used for any environment in which a committee selects one of two alternatives. Section 4 extends the analysis to more general voting environments (more than two alternatives, and arbitrary voting rules).
(that is, p (t) > 0 for every type pro le t in T ).
5 A juror's utility depends on the pro le of types and the chosen alternative. Formally, for each juror i there exists a utility function
This setup encompasses the strategic voting models that have been commonly analyzed in the literature (see, for instance, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] or Feddersen and Pesendorfer
[1998]). We shall often use (a simple version of) the standard voting setup to illustrate our results, as described in the example below.
Example 1 (the standard jury setup) A jury of n individuals has to determine the fate of a defendant. There are two states, I (the defendant is innocent) and G (the defendant is guilty), with prior probabilities P (I) and P (G) ; respectively.
Juror i's preferences are given by:
where q i 2 (0; 1) denotes juror i's threshold of reasonable doubt (capturing her concern for convicting the innocent relative to that for acquitting the innocent).
Each agent i observes a signal t i 2 fI; Gg of accuracy : That is,
Conditional on the state, signals are independent across jurors. Let T = fI; Gg n denote the set of pro les of signals.
Clearly, the utility function u i : fA; Cg T ! R of juror i is given by:
Note that the setup studied in this paper is more general than that of the standard model in that types can be taken from arbitrary sets, and there are essentially no restrictions on the prior distribution over types. In particular, types may be correlated across individuals.
As for the choice of the defendant's fate, jurors select an alternative by voting. Each juror can vote to acquit, a; or to convict, c: 6 We let V i = fa; cg denote the set of actions available to juror i; and V = fa; cg n the set of action pro les. Under the voting rule r = 1; : : : ; n; the alternative C is selected if and only if r or more jurors vote to convict.
Given a voting rule r and a pro le of votes v; we let r (v) denote the jury's decision.
Formally, r : V ! fA; Cg is de ned as follows:
The voting rule r de nes the following voting game G r : Nature selects a pro le of types in T according to the probability distribution p; then jurors learn their types, after which they vote simultaneously. If the pro les of types and actions are t and v; respectively, juror
In general, the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the game G r does not coincide with the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the game G r 0 , where r 6 = r 0 , as the following example illustrates.
Example 2 Consider the standard jury setup with n = 4: Assume that the two states are equally likely, P (I) = P (G) ; and that the accuracy of the signal is = 3=4: Lastly, suppose that q 1 = q 2 = 2=5 and q 3 = q 4 = 3=5:
Let (k 0 ; k) denote the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty when k Consider the voting game G 2 and the following strategy pro le. The rst three jurors vote informatively (i.e., they vote to acquit if they observe I and to convict if they observe G), whereas juror 4 votes to acquit regardless of her signal. This strategy pro le constitutes a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of G 2 : First, consider juror i = 1; 2; 3: The probability that the defendant is guilty given that juror i observes signal t i and her vote is pivotal is equal to Pr (Gjt i and i is pivotal) = 8 > < > :
Clearly, juror i has an incentive to vote according to her signal. For juror 4 we have Pr (Gjt 4 and 4 is pivotal) = 8 > < > :
In both cases, juror 4 prefers to vote to acquit.
The above equilibrium implements the outcome : fI; Gg 4 ! fA; Cg under which the alternative C is chosen if at least two of the rst three jurors receive the signal G.
However, is not an equilibrium outcome of the voting game G 3 : In fact, under the voting rule r = 3; can be implemented only if the rst three jurors vote informatively and juror 4 votes to convict regardless of her signal. But this strategy pro le does not constitute an equilibrium of G 3 . In particular, consider juror 4 and suppose that she observes signal I. The probability that the defendant is guilty when her vote is pivotal is equal to (2; 4) = 1=2 < q 4 : It follows that juror 4 has an incentive to deviate and vote to acquit.
The focus of the paper is the comparison of di erent voting rules when jurors are allowed to deliberate before casting their votes. We model deliberations by adding cheap talk to the voting game G r : A cheap talk extension of G r is an extensive-form game in which the jurors, after learning their types, exchange messages. At the last stage of the game, the jurors vote. Payo s depend on the jurors' types and votes, but not on their messages. For technical simplicity, it will be useful to start by assuming that that there exists an impartial mediator who helps the jurors communicate. This assumption will be dropped later on in Section 3.1.
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A strategy pro le of a cheap talk extension of G r induces an outcome, i.e., a mapping from the set of types T into the interval [0; 1].
(t) denotes the probability that the defendant is convicted when the pro le of types is t (and the jurors adopt the strategy pro le ). We let r denote the set of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions of G r :
The notion of communication equilibrium (Myerson [1982] , Forges [1986] ) allows us to characterize the set r : As is standard, we denote by (V ) the set of probability distributions over the set of action pro les V: A mapping from T into (V ) is a communication equilibrium of G r if and only if the following inequalities hold:
Intuitively, consider the following cheap talk extension of the voting game G r : All jurors report their types to the mediator. Suppose that the pro le of reports is t: Then the mediator selects an action pro le randomly, according to the probability distribution (t) ;
and informs each juror of her own action. Finally, the jurors vote. The inequalities in (1) guarantee that the cheap talk extension admits a sequential equilibrium in which two types of incentive constraints hold: 1. all jurors are sincere; and 2. all jurors obey the mediator's recommendations.
It follows from the argument above that any communication equilibrium induces an outcome in r : The revelation principle (Myerson [1982] ) assures that r contains, in fact, only outcomes that are induced by communication equilibria. 10 In particular, the set r coincides with the set of outcomes induced by communication equilibria of G r . Let V C r denote the set of pro les of votes that lead to conviction under the voting rule r: Formally,
Then we have:
A Preliminary Result
The goal of this section is to compare di erent voting rules when the jurors can communicate. We start with a simple example which suggests that communication may render two di erent voting rules similar in terms of the outcomes that they implement.
Example 3 Consider the environment of Example 2. Recall that denotes the outcome under which the defendant is convicted if at least two of the rst three jurors observe the signal G. Recall also that is an equilibrium outcome of the voting game G 2 but not of
We now show that can be also implemented with the voting rule r = 3 when communication is allowed. Consider the following communication protocol. All jurors report their signal to the mediator, who then dispels unanimous recommendations that implement : That is, the mediator recommends the action c to every juror if at least two of the rst three jurors report signal G. In all other cases, the mediator recommends the action a to every juror.
The strategy pro le in which all jurors are truthful and obedient is a sequential equilibrium of the voting game with communication. Notice that the mediator ignores the signal of juror 4 and that represents the optimal outcome for all jurors when only three signals are available. It follows that for juror i = 1; 2; 3 it is strictly optimal to play the equilibrium strategy (see Example 2). Finally, consider juror 4. First, suppose that she receives the recommendation a: The posterior probability that the defendant is guilty is equal to Pr (Gjt 4 and at least two other jurors observed I) = 8 > < > :
Suppose now that juror 4 receives the recommendation c: The posterior probability that the defendant is guilty is equal to Pr (Gjt 4 and at least two other jurors observed G) = 8 > < > :
It follows that juror 4 always has a strict incentive to obey the mediator's recommendation.
Thus, while unilateral deviations are inconsequential at the voting stage of our game with communication, the jurors are, in fact, using undominated strategies. This observation will be expanded on in Section 3.2.
We are now ready to generalize the above example and compare the sets r and r 0 for two di erent voting rules r and r 0 : In Proposition 1 we show that, except for the voting rules r = 1 and r = n; 11 all other \intermediate" rules are equivalent. If jurors can communicate, 11 The voting rules r = 1 and r = n are the only rules which require a unanimous consensus in order to adopt a certain alternative (A if r = 1; C if r = n).
every outcome that can be implemented with a voting rule r 6 = 1; n can also be implemented with a di erent voting rule r 0 6 = 1; n: Furthermore, by adopting an extreme voting rule (r = 1 or r = n), we cannot enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1 2 = : : : = n 1 : Moreover, 1 2 and n 2 ; and these inclusions may be strict.
Proof:
Consider any voting rule r = 1; : : : ; n: The rst step of our proof is to show that if belongs to r then satis es the following inequalities:
If is in r ; there exists a communication equilibrium of G r that induces : For every juror i and for every pair (t i ; t 0 i ) we therefore have:
where the inequality follows from the truth-telling constraints of the communication equilibrium :
Consider now a voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n 1: We demonstrate that if : T ! [0; 1] satis es inequality (2), then belongs to r : Given ; consider the following mapping~ from T into First of all, no juror has an incentive to disobey the mediator's recommendation. Indeed, when the mediator follows~ ; she makes the same recommendation to all jurors. A juror's vote cannot change the nal outcome if all her fellow jurors are obedient (notice that we are not considering r = 1 and r = n). Furthermore, the fact that satis es inequality (2) implies that no juror has an incentive to lie to the mediator when her fellow jurors are sincere.
We conclude that 2 ; : : : ; n 1 coincide with the set of the mappings from T into [0; 1] which satisfy inequality (2). Moreover, this set contains 1 and n :
We now show that the inclusions 1 2 and n 2 may be strict. Indeed, consider rst the unanimity rule r = n. Any outcome in n can be implemented with a communication equilibrium in which the mediator sends the same recommendation to all jurors. This guarantees that no juror has an incentive to disobey recommendation a. Of course, the action pro le (c; : : : ; c) is necessary to convict the defendant under the unanimity rule. If a juror does not follow recommendation c the nal decision will be A (in this case the juror's message is irrelevant). Thus, an outcome : T ! [0; 1] satis es the obedience constraints if and only if the following inequalities hold:
We conclude that the set n consists of all mappings from T into [0; 1] which satisfy inequalities (2) and (3). Similarly, 1 coincides with the set of mappings from T into [0; 1] which satisfy inequality (2) and the following inequality:
Clearly, inequality (2) implies neither inequality (3) nor inequality (4). In particular, there may exist outcomes that belong to 2 but do not belong to 1 or to n :
The proof of Proposition 1 is rather intuitive. Consider an outcome implementable with deliberations under the voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n 1: As we pointed out in Section 2.1, In fact, in the proof of Proposition 1 we derive the full characterization of equilibria sets corresponding to rules r = 2; :::; n 1; which is given by the set of inequalities (2).
With voting rules 1 and n (unanimity) it is generally possible to implement only a subset of the outcomes that can be implemented with the \intermediate" voting rules r = 2; ::; n 1.
Intuitively, consider rst the unanimity rule r = n. Any outcome generated with unanimity can be implemented via a mediator who dispels unanimous recommendations as above. Just like all of the intermediate voting rules, when the recommendation is for everyone to vote for acquittal, no one juror has an incentive to deviate, since her deviation cannot a ect the nal outcome. However, when the recommendation is to cast a vote for conviction, a unilateral deviation can in fact alter the nal decision under unanimity, and an additional constraint needs to be satis ed for jurors to obey such a recommendation. This supplementary condition identi es outcomes corresponding to unanimity as a subset of the outcomes generated by any of the intermediate voting rules. Similar intuition holds for the inclusion of outcomes generated by voting rule r = 1: Formally, these additional constraints are derived in the proof and given by inequalities (3) and (4).
Restricting Protocols and Strategies
In this section, we illustrate the robustness of our preliminary result. First, we show that the equivalence does not require extremely complex communication protocols. In fact, restricting communication to take place publicly in one round, maintains the equivalence, even when there is no mediating party. Second, we demonstrate the robustness of the result to stronger assumptions on voters' behavior, crossing out the potential use of weakly dominated strategies.
Public Communication
Throughout Section 2 we have assumed that each juror can communicate privately with a trustworthy mediator. However, in many group decisions, particularly in juries, a reliable mediator is not available and the agents can only exchange messages with each other. In addition, there are cases, like jury deliberations, in which an individual cannot communicate with only some of her fellow decision makers. In juries, during deliberations communication is public and every message is observed by all the jurors. In this section we investigate how these restrictions a ect our results.
Given a voting rule r; we de ne a cheap talk extension with public communication of introduced by Forges [1990] , in which one universal mechanism serves to implement the equilibrium outcomes of all noncooperative games with incomplete information and at least four players. This observation is important from the point of view of mechanism design. Indeed, consider a designer who aims at implementing a certain feasible outcome. To accomplish this, the designer should do two things. First, she should nd a cheap talk extension with an equilibrium that induces the desired outcome. Second, the designer should induce the agents to play that equilibrium. Our analysis shows that, without loss of generality, the 12 A jointly controlled lottery is a communication procedure that allows two or more players to select an outcome randomly according to a given probability distribution. The lottery is robust to unilateral deviations. See the proof of Proposition 2 for details.
designer can use the communication protocol described in the proof of Proposition 2 and restrict attention to the problem of inducing agents to play the desired equilibrium. Moreover, any outcome that can be implemented with the voting rules r = 1; n can be also implemented with the intermediate voting rules.
Weakly Undominated Strategies
Consider a jury with twelve members. Suppose that the jurors do not have any private information. Furthermore, nine jurors prefer to acquit the defendant and three jurors prefer to convict her. Certainly, if one is willing to entertain the idea that individuals care about their vote 13 See Gerardi and Yariv [2005] for an analysis of a particular mechanism design problem of this form.
14 In this example we assume that the jurors have \partisan" preferences. Of course, partisan preferences are more appropriate in environments di erent from juries (for example, an election with two candidates). Here we follow our terminology and frame the example in the context of the jury model. coinciding with the selected alternative, then our equivalence result holds directly with undominated strategies. For example, suppose that every juror has the following lexicographic preferences. If her vote a ects the nal outcome, the juror's preferences are identical to the preferences described in Section 2.1. If her vote does not in uence the nal outcome, the juror prefers to vote in favor of the winning alternative. It is easy to check that the strategies employed in the proof of Proposition 2 are weakly undominated.
In this section we take a di erent route to ruling out weakly dominated strategies.
Namely, we show that under a few weak assumptions on the preference and information structure, the results of Proposition 1 extend to the case of weakly undominated strategies.
In particular, we show that any outcome in r ; r = 2; : : : ; n 1; can be implemented with a cheap talk extension and a sequential equilibrium that does not use dominated strategies.
To simplify the exposition and the proof of Proposition 3 below, we assume the presence of an impartial mediator who helps the jurors communicate. 15 For any voting rule r; we consider cheap talk extensions in which the jurors communicate with one another and with the mediator.
In games with incomplete information (as the ones we are considering) there are two di erent notions of dominance: ex-ante dominance and interim dominance (see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] , pages 226-229). Ex-ante domination requires that all types of a juror have the same beliefs about the play of the other jurors. In contrast, interim domination allows di erent types to have di erent beliefs. As is well known, it is easier for a strategy to be interim weakly undominated than ex-ante weakly undominated. In this section we restrict attention to the stronger notion of ex-ante undominated strategies.
Formally, consider a voting rule r and cheap talk extension of G r :
denote a (possibly mixed) strategy of juror i; where i (t i ) indicates the actions that juror i chooses when her type is t i : By a slight abuse of notation, we will extend the domain of u i and let u i ( i (t i ) ; i (t i ) ; t) denote the expected utility of juror i when the pro le of types 15 The equivalence result with weakly undominated strategies holds even when a mediator is not available. See our discussion following Proposition 3 below.
is t and the jurors use the strategies ( i (t i ) ; i (t i )):
De nition 1
The strategy i is ex-ante weakly undominated for juror i if there does not exist a strategy^ i such that
for every strategy pro le i and with at least one strict inequality.
We let^ r denote the sets of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions of G r in which the jurors do not use ex-ante weakly dominated strategies. In order to characterize the set^ r ; we need to make the following assumptions.
A1 (Informational Smallness)
For every juror i = 1; : : : ; n and every alternative x = A; C; there exists a pro le of types t Assumption A1 guarantees that each juror would bene t from the information available to the other jurors. In some sense, this assumption implies that each juror is \information-ally small". 16 A juror's information is not su cient for her to conclude which alternative 16 Note that A1 is qualitatively di erent from the concept of informational smallness introduced by McLean and Postlewaite [2002] in that it is not probabilistic. In fact, for any i; the probability the realized types satisfy A1 can be arbitrarily close to 0: is optimal. Intuitively, Assumption A1 is crucial for the equivalence result to hold with undominated strategies, since it allows us to rule out those situations in which some jurors always prefer one of the alternatives over the other, regardless of the realized types of her fellow jurors.
On the other hand, assumption A2 ensures that a juror's information is never useless.
There is always a situation in which two types of the same juror prefer di erent alternatives.
In practice, the process of voir dire exercised in the American court system is e ectively intended to assure that assumptions A1 and A2 hold for trial jurors. Indeed, voir dire is used to select jurors that are su ciently unbiased so as to consider the case at hand fairly, based only on the evidence presented in court. Technically, assumptions A1 and A2 are satis ed by most models studied in the literature. The following example illustrates the restrictions they impose on the standard jury model.
Example 4
Consider the standard jury setup with n jurors (Example 1). Recall that (k; n) denotes the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty when k out of n jurors observe the guilty signal G: It is simple to verify that Assumptions A1 and A2 are satis ed as long as q i 2 ( (1; n) ; (n 1; n)) for every juror i: Note that jurors' preferences may di er by quite a margin. For example, for a jury of size n = 12; prior P (I) = P (G) = We are now ready to characterize the sets^ 2 ; : : : ;^ n 1 and show that our equivalence result holds even with ex-ante weakly undominated strategies. In this section, we have assumed that the jurors can communicate with an impartial mediator. This assumption was made only to simplify the exposition of the proof of Proposition 3. However, the assumption is not crucial and our equivalence result extends to the case in which an impartial mediator is not available. In fact, by using a communication protocol similar to the one introduced in Gerardi [2004] , it is possible to show that if there are at least ve jurors and Assumptions A1 and A2 hold, then any outcome in r ; r = 2; : : : ; n 1; can be implemented with a sequential equilibrium in undominated strategies of a cheap talk extension with direct communication (for the sake of brevity, we omit the details).
In order to test the robustness of the equivalence result, we have considered sequential equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. However, another route would be to adopt a 
Deliberative Voting with More than Two Alternatives
This section replicates the construction introduced in Section 2 for a general set of alternatives and a general set of allowable actions for each participant.
Consider a group of n > 3 individuals, whom we will refer to as voters, that has to select one of K > 2 alternatives from A fA 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A K g. As before, each voter i has a type t i which is private information. We denote by T i the set of voter i's types, and assume that T i is nite. We let T = Q n i=1 T i denote the set of type pro les. The prior probability distribution over T is denoted by p: As before, we assume that p has full support. A voter's utility depends on the pro le of types and the chosen alternative. Formally, for each voter i there exists a function u i : A T ! R.
A collective choice structure on fn; T; A; fu i g n i=1 g constitutes of two elements:
1. The set of available actions. We denote by V i the actions available to voter i and by V V 1 V 2 : : : V n the set of all possible action pro les. The collective choice structure (V; ) de nes an analogous Bayesian game G V; to that de ned in Section 2.1: Nature selects a pro le of types in T according to the probability distribution p; then voters learn their types, after which they vote simultaneously. If the pro les of types and actions are t and v; respectively, voter i obtains P
In order to capture outcomes of the voting procedure with communication, we look at cheap talk extensions of G V; : Voters exchange messages after learning their types, but before simultaneously casting their votes. We will present the case in which a reliable mediator is handy.
18
A strategy pro le of a cheap talk extension of G V; induces an outcome, a mapping from the set of types T into the simplex (A). The vector (t) denotes the probability distribution over collective outcomes when the pro le of types is t (and the voters adopt the strategy pro le ). We let V; denote the set of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions of G V; : As in Section 2.1, we characterize the set V; using the notion of communication equilibria. A mapping from T into (V ) ; the set of probability distributions over V , is a communication equilibrium of G V; if and only if the following inequalities hold:
The set V; coincides with the set of outcomes induced by communication equilibria of G V; :
In the case of two alternatives, a crucial aspect of the equivalence result was the ability to replicate any equilibrium outcome with strategy pro les that were robust to unilateral deviations (via unanimous pro les). We will therefore replicate the construction illustrating the equivalence result for the class of veto-free collective choice structures in which no one agent has the power to overturn a choice for all circumstances. Formally,
De nition 2 (Veto-Free Structures) The collective choice structure (V; ) is veto-free if for every A k in A, there exists a pro le v 2 V such that for any i = 1; : : : ; n; and any
That is, the collective choice structure is veto-free if for every alternative, there is a pro le of actions that would yield that alternative with probability one, even if one of the committee members deviates. For example, all of the intermediate threshold voting rules discussed in Section 2 are veto-free. The following examples identify most of the well-known multiple alternative voting rules as part of a veto-free collective choice structure (see, e.g., Cox [1987] and references therein).
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Examples (Scoring Rules, Alternative Voting, and Condorcet structures)
1. Generalized Scoring Rules. A scoring rule is characterized by a set of scores
R. Without loss of generality, we will suppose that there exists a k > 1 such
Each voter i's action set can be written as V i = f( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; K ) : ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; K ) is a permutation of (! 1 ; ! 2 ; : : : ; ! K )g: So a
voter reports an allocation of scores to the entire set of candidates. The candidate is then chosen according to:
The scoring rule f! k g K k=1 is veto-free if, for example,
19 We omit some immediate proofs which appear in Gerardi and Yariv [2003] .
where n div k denotes the integer part of n k and n mod k n k (n div k); the remainder of n when divided by k:
Some of the scoring rules that are commonly used are in fact veto-free:
Plurality. When ! 1 = 1 and ! 2 = : : : = ! K = 0; the scoring rule is equivalent to the plurality rule. We will denote the equilibria outcomes of the plurality election with communication by P lurality :
Borda Rule. The scores ! 1 = K 1; ! 2 = K 2; : : : ; ! K = 0; correspond to the Borda method of electing an alternative. These scores satisfy the condition for a veto-free structure as well, as long as n > 4. We will denote the equilibria outcomes of the Borda election with communication by Borda :
2. Alternative Voting. 20 In the Alternative Voting collective choice structure, each voter reports a strict rank order of the alternatives, that is
The voting rule AV (v) is de ned through a recursive process. Top preference alternatives are tallied. The candidate with lowest count is eliminated and the votes are reconsidered as restricted orderings over the remaining K 1 candidates. The process is repeated until one candidate has received half the votes as the most preferred. At each stage, a tie leads to a uniform randomization between the tied candidates. We will denote the set of equilibria corresponding to Alternative Voting with communication
3. Condorcet Winner. In the Condorcet collective choice structure, each voter reports a strict rank order of the alternatives as in Alternative Voting:
The voting rule Condorcet (v) is de ned as follows. For each pair of candidates, it is resolved how many agents preferred each candidate over the other by counting whether they were higher ranked in the reported preference ordering. If any candidate k is preferred to all other candidates, they are declared the winner and
If there is no winner, a top cycle is determined. A top cycle is a subset of candidates such that each of the members will beat all candidates outside the top cycle in pairwise competition, but not all of the candidates within the top cycle. There are several ways that the literature considers for choosing one candidate as the winner from the top cycle: by uniform randomization, by Alternative Voting within the top cycle, or by choosing the candidate who, in the pair-wise competition she does worst in, loses by the least amount (and randomize upon a tie). All these speci cations yield a veto-free structure. We will consider Alternative Voting to take place whenever a runo vote is necessary and denote the corresponding set of equilibria, when communication is possible, by Condorcert :
We are now ready to compare the sets V; and V 0 ; 0 for two di erent collective choice structures (V; ) and (V 0 ; 0 ): Proposition 4 shows that all veto-free collective choice structures are equivalent. If voters can communicate, every outcome that can be implemented with a veto-free structure (V; ) can also be implemented with a di erent veto-free structure (V 0 ; 0 ): Furthermore, by adopting a non veto-free structure, we cannot enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes. Contemplate a modi cation of this mapping which prescribes to each pro le of private reports a pro le of recommendations in V that corresponds, via ; to the social alternative that would have resulted in the original protocol corresponding to (V 0 ; 0 ). Moreover, since (V; ) is vetofree, the pro le of recommendations can be assumed to be robust to unilateral deviations.
In particular, the modi ed protocol generates an implementable outcome in V; coinciding with the one we started with in
is veto-free as well, the reverse inclusion is achieved and V; = V 0 ; 0 . Our generalized equivalence result follows.
Since Plurality, Borda, Alternative Voting, and Condorcet collective choice structures are all veto-free when n > 4, it follows from Proposition 4 that they all yield they same set of equilibrium outcomes once communication is introduced. Formally, if we assume that the committee is comprised of at least four members,
Note that similar analysis to that provided in Section 3.1 would assure the generalized equivalence result to hold with unmediated communication and only one round of public deliberations. Moreover, mild restrictions on voters' preferences, as introduced in Section 3.2, would provide the equivalence result when voters use weakly undominated strategies.
Conclusions
The main insight coming out of our current inquiry is that communication between individuals in collective choice scenarios has a fundamental impact on the resulting equilibrium outcomes. In particular, in a generalized voting setup, deliberations render all veto-free rules equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. This result is robust to several restrictions on the communication protocols themselves (e.g., one round, public communication), and, under a couple of mild assumptions, when voters are con ned to using weakly undominated strategies.
Our analysis illustrates the importance of modeling communication in collective choice environments. It is important to note that when the format of communication is xed, predictions across voting institutions may, in fact, di er. Therefore, producing a working model of debates and deliberations may be crucial in selecting institutions in particular environments. We view this as an important avenue for future research.
As a particular example, our results suggest the need for future theoretical work to explain the empirical diversity of voting institutions in the jury arena. Indeed, when there are no restrictions on the way jurors can deliberate, the theory implies that predictions of outcomes across a wide range of institutions should be identical.
From a design point of view, our equivalence observation may prove particularly important. Indeed, the plausibility of communication makes the problem of a social planner designing a jury system (or a principal choosing a committee, for that matter) one of equilibrium selection, rather than pure institutional design via the voting rule itself. The analysis in this paper opens a broad set of questions related to the choice of committees (in terms of their size and preference distribution) as well as the speci cation of communication protocols.
Regarding equilibrium notions, while we succeeded in identifying conditions for the equivalence result to hold when voters are using weakly undominated strategies, it would be interesting to go even further and investigate how institutional outcomes change when voters make mistakes, and realize their fellow jurors may be doing so as well. One way to start such an endeavor would be to look at a stronger equilibrium concept, such as trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Unfortunately, as of yet, there are scarcely any general results in the literature characterizing trembling hand perfect equilibria in games with communication.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Let be an outcome in 
If (z 1 ; z 2 ) 6 (t) all jurors vote to convict. If (z 1 ; z 2 ) > (t) all jurors vote to acquit.
Of course, this strategy pro le induces the outcome : It is also easy to check that our strategy pro le is a sequential equilibrium (consistent beliefs can be derived from any sequence of completely mixed strategy pro les converging to the equilibrium pro le). Clearly, a juror does not have a pro table deviation in stage 2 since her vote does not a ect the nal outcome. By announcing two numbers in the unit interval jurors 1 and 2 perform a jointly controlled lottery which determines how the jurors will vote. Since z 1 is independent of z 2 and uniformly distributed, (z 1 ; z 2 ) is also independent of z 2 and uniformly distributed.
Thus juror 2 is indi erent between all numbers in [0; 1] (of course, the same argument can be applied to juror 1). Finally, the vector of types announced by the jurors determines which lottery will be used in the second step of the game. Inequalities in (2) guarantee that each juror has an incentive to be sincere provided that all other jurors behave likewise.
Proof of Proposition 3
Fix r = 2; : : : ; n 1: To prove Proposition 3 it is enough to show that r ^ r . Assume that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold and x an outcome in r : Consider the following cheap talk extension. In stage 1 all jurors report their messages simultaneously to the mediator.
Each juror i sends a message that has two components. The rst component is her type.
The second component is an element of the set M i de ned by: For each vector of reports, the mediator selects an action pro le in V = fa; cg n according to some probability distribution (speci ed below) and informs each juror only of her own action. Finally, jurors vote and an alternative is selected according to the voting rule r:
Consider the following speci cation of the mediator's choice of an action pro le. We distinguish between three cases:
Suppose that m j = ia; for some i = 1; : : : ; n and for each juror j 6 = i: Let t i denote the pro le of types reported by the jurors di erent from i (t i is an element of T i ). In this case, the mediator randomly selects an alternative, A or C; with equal probabilities.
First, suppose that alternative A is selected. If t i = t A i ; the mediator recommends action a to juror i and to the rst n r jurors di erent from i (i.e., the mediator recommends a to n r + 1 jurors) and action c to every other juror. If t i 6 = t A i ; the mediator recommends action a to all jurors. Suppose now that alternative C is selected. If t i = t C i ; the mediator recommends action c to juror i and to the rst r 1 jurors di erent from i and action a to every other juror. If t i 6 = t C i ; the mediator recommends action c to all jurors.
Suppose that for some i = 1; : : : ; n; m j = ib; for all jurors j 6 = i: Let t i denote the type reported by juror i and t i the pro le of types reported by the jurors di erent from i:
If m i = 0; the mediator selects (with probability one) the alternative that is optimal for juror i when the pro le of types is (t i ; t i ) (if both alternatives are optimal, the mediator selects A). Let h (t i ; t i ) denote this alternative. If m i 6 = 0; the mediator selects the alternative di erent from h (t i ; t i ) : In any case, the mediator recommends to every juror to vote in favor of the chosen alternative.
Finally, in all other cases, the mediator selects alternatives A and C with probabilities 1 (t) and (t) ; respectively (where t is the pro le of types reported by the jurors).
The mediator recommends to every juror to vote in favor of the chosen alternative.
Consider now the following strategy for jurors i = 1; : : : ; n. Every type t i reports the message (t i ; 0) and always obeys the mediator's recommendation (even when she reports a message di erent from (t i ; 0)). Let i denote this strategy. Of course, the strategy pro le ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) induces the outcome : It is also easy to show that we can nd a system of beliefs ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) such that the assessment (( 1 ; : : : ; n ) ; ( 1 ; : : : ; n )) constitutes a sequential equilibrium of our game. It is enough to take a sequence of completely mixed strategy pro les which converges to ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) and such that for each juror i = 1; : : : ; n; deviations to messages with the second component in the set f1a; : : : ; (i 1) a; (i + 1) a; : : : ; nag are much less likely than other deviations. This implies that in every information set a juror assigns probability zero to the event that her vote is pivotal (we omit the details). Sequential rationality of the assessment (( 1 ; : : : ; n ) ; ( 1 ; : : : ; n )) trivially follows.
To complete our proof, we need to show that for each juror i = 1; : : : ; n; the strategy i is ex-ante weakly undominated. Of course, a strategy for juror i speci es for each type t i the message that t i sends and an action for every pair of recommendations and message (even the messages that were not sent). However, for our purposes it is enough to consider the reduced representation and restrict attention to the actions corresponding to the message actually sent.
Let S (t i ) denote the set of pure strategies of type t i in which t i does not always obey the mediator's recommendation. Denote by S 0 (t i ) the set of pure strategies of t i in which t i sends a message di erent from (t i ; 0) and then obeys the mediator's recommendation. Consider any strategy i of juror i di erent from i : At least one of the following two alternatives is true: (i) there exists a typet i such that i t i assigns positive probability to a strategy in the set S t i ; (ii) there exists a typet i such that i t i assigns positive probability to a strategy in the set S 0 t i :
Start with case (i). Consider the strategy pro le of jurors di erent from i in which every type t j of juror j 6 = i sends the message (t j ; ia) and then obeys the mediator's recommendation. It follows from assumption A1 that against this strategy pro le, typet i strictly prefers the strategy i t i to the strategy i t i . Moreover, assumption A1 also implies that for every other type t i the strategy i (t i ) is weakly better than the strategy i (t i ).
For case (ii), consider the strategy pro le in which every type t j of juror j 6 = i sends the message (t j ; ib) and then is obedient. Denote this pro le by 0 i and consider typet i : It follows from assumption A2 that against 0 i ; the strategy i t i is strictly better than any pure strategy in whicht i sends a message (t i ; 0) ; where t i 6 =t i : Furthermore, assumption A1 implies that against 0 i ; i t i is strictly better than any pure strategy in whicht i sends a message (t i ; m i ) ; where m i 6 = 0 and t i 2 T i : Of course, against 0 i disobedience is not bene cial. Thus,t i strictly prefers i t i to i t i : Finally, assumptions A1 and A2 also imply that against 0 i any other type t i weakly prefers i (t i ) to i (t i ) :
